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and economists like Amartya Sen and Lester 
Thurow. 
ROBERT E. LANE 
Yale University 
Nationalism, Ethnocentrism and Personality. 
By H. D. Forbes. (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1985. Pp. x + 219. $27.50.) 
Since the writing of The Authoritarian Per- 
sonality in 1950, a number of attempts have 
been made to extend the principal themes of 
that classic work in a way that advances 
political philosophy. Forbes's work is another 
example of such a piece. Though the recogni- 
tion of the theoretical potential of The 
Authoritarian Personality (AP) is laudable, 
Forbes unfortunately fails to add much of 
substance to its theoretical thrust. 
The reasons for Forbes's failure are 
predominantly two-fold. The first is that 
Forbes is wrestling with a massive collection of 
dissertation data (collected in 1968) that unfor- 
tunately does not tap any significant theo- 
retical vein. The second is Forbes's own confu- 
sion concerning the theoretical state of the AP 
argument, as well as his confusion over why 
critical theory, his attempted avenue to 
theoretical advancement, is itself mired within 
the ideological debate over the role of 
psychology within political theory. 
With regard to the empirical difficulties of 
the work, Forbes's two hypotheses are: 
1. Extreme nationalists are recruited 
disproportionately from those with the 
authoritarian structure of personality; and 
2. Different nationalists' attitudes are struc- 
tured, or interrelated, in such a way as to 
justify using the term "ethnocentrism" to 
describe the attitudes of extreme na- 
tionalists. (p. 3) 
His findings, the result of questionnaires ad- 
ministered to French-speaking and English- 
speaking Canadian high school students, is 
that there are different kinds of nationalism. 
Specifically, what Forbes finds is that 
ethnocentrism is only found to correlate with 
nationalism in those circumstances in which 
the outgroup is clearly different from the in- 
group. At the least, such a finding is already 
implicit within AP; at most, it still does little to 
advance political philosophy. 
The attempt to advance political philosophy 
beyond the findings of Forbes's study is even 
more frustrating. Forbes, to his credit, does 
understand that AP is a clear outgrowth of the 
Frankfurt school of thought that we know as 
critical theory. He is aware that works such as 
AP are the result of a historically rooted ad- 
mixture of Marx and Freud, and that the 
writings of Horkheimer, Fromm, Reich, and, 
of course, Adorno himself all attempted to 
deal with the psychological or, as it is fre- 
quently called, the "early" period of Marx. Yet 
if Forbes gives such theoretical significance to 
the critical perspective, one must ask why the 
almost paltry scope of the two hypotheses of 
the book is not supplanted by more than an oc- 
casional reference to critical theory. Within 
193 pages of text, critical theory is abandoned 
after page 15 until it is resurrected on pages 
145-148, and later on pages 189-193 (with the 
ironic disclaimer that "noone familiar with 
critical theory would lightheartedly undertake 
to plumb its depths and report the results in a 
page"). 
Even there, the "doctrine (or method) of 
liberation" that Forbes finds in critical theory is 
searching for a kind of "objectivity" that in 
turn is the result of internal contradictions be- 
tween "objects" and "the claims made on their 
behalf" (p. 191). The difficulty with such a 
theory of liberation is that it deals with only 
the contradiction between reality and objec- 
tive, between promise and performance. What 
AP offers, which Forbes seems to have little 
sense of but which others have dealt with quite 
precisely (see, Christian Bay, The Structure of 
Freedom, New York; Athenium, 1968) is that 
perspectives upon reality differ widely be- 
tween the authoritarian and the anti-authori- 
tarian personality. Stated another way, the 
latter-day questions surrounding AP have 
dealt with relative subjectivities, not 
objectivity. 
There is now more than adequate evidence 
that there are significant and testable distinc- 
tions between psychologies that are highly 
relevant to differentiation between the political 
left and the political right. Such distinctions 
are available not only within the work of 
political scientists like Bay, but also within the 
work of cognitive psychologists like Herman 
Witkin, Joseph Royce, and Howard Gardner. 
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To resurrect a classic work requires that one be 
aware of what has gone on since its demise. To 
attempt a theoretical advance upon a signifi- 
cant work without an exploration into the dif- 
ficulties and biases of that work's theoretical 
framework, particularly within an area so 
ideological in its origins and implications as the 
authoritarian literature is, assures that the cur- 
rent work will be but a small contribution. 
WILLiAM P. KREML 
University of South Carolina 
Georges Sorel: The Character and Develop- 
ment of His Thought. By J. R. Jennings. 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985. Pp. xi 
+ 209. $25.00.) 
J. R. Jennings's tudy manages the difficult 
task of combing intellectual biography and the 
analysis of ideas. It is especially good at mak- 
ing sense of the transitions that are notoriously 
a feature of Sorel's thinking. The book is com- 
pact and clear, the proportions of its discus- 
sion judicious, and its scholarship faultless. It 
is one of rather few works on Sorel that one 
could recommend to students without fear of 
their being confused or misled: At the same 
time, it is a sophisticated work (but unpreten- 
tiously so) that one ought carefully to consult 
in doing research on any of the diverse topics it 
discusses. It is one of several recent pieces of 
evidence that Sorel scholarship is at last being 
given the imaginative treatment it deserves. 
One French commentator (quoted by Jen- 
nings) has said that Sorel's writing "excluded 
order, clarity, and, in general, all that would 
make the assimilation of his ideas easier." Jen- 
nings himself elaborates on the difficulty of 
reading Sorel's work, referring to its sheer ex- 
tent and diversity, its frequent abstruseness, its 
heterogeneity of level, and the volatility of the 
hopes (and the despair) that impelled it. He 
adds that "pluralism" precluded Sorel from of- 
fering any unified or systematic exposition of 
his thinking (pp. 176-77). Pluralism is not in- 
herently unsystematic. If Sorel had held that a 
single set of philosophical principles dictated 
identical conclusions in diverse fields-Jen- 
nings speaks of "methodological, scientific, 
epistemological and ethical pluralism" (pp. 12, 
15)-then he would have been a systematizer 
indeed. However, Jennings does not take 
Sorel's pluralism to be anything so elaborate or 
developed. It is something more like a disposi- 
tion than a theory, and must be defined in a 
way supple enough to embrace several poten- 
tially separable things: conflicts between 
disciplines, conceptual diversity within 
disciplines, differences between types of ex- 
planation, incommensurability, as well as a 
sheer stubborn sense of the complexity of life 
and a hatred of the naive. 
What is called pluralism here might possibly 
invite, the alternative label of dualism. 
Dualism may of course be merely an im- 
poverished pluralism (or a monism manqu6) 
but it need not be, and there seems to be a dif- 
ference between positing an indefinite number 
of possible points of view and insisting on ex- 
haustive choices. Very often, Sorel does the 
latter. He speaks of the artificial and the 
natural, the inside and the outside, the abstract 
and the concrete, the psychological and the 
scientific, and so on. Even his pluralistic doc- 
trine of communities (cites) of enquirers tends, 
effectively, to collapse, into a "polar" opposi- 
tion of science and religion (p. 11). It would be 
enormously interesting to examine the relation 
between Sorel's disposition to pluralize, or to 
open questions to an indefinite number of 
answers, and his disposition to dualize, or to 
insist that answers of only two kinds can 
count. It is among the many merits of 
Jennings's book that it poses such constructive 
and far-reaching questions. 
RICHARD VERNON 
University of Western Ontario 
The Ivory Tower: Essays in Philosophy and 
Public Policy. By Anthony Kenny. (New 
York and Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985. 
Pp. 137. $29.95, cloth.) 
Kenny's collection of philosophical essays is 
intended to show that the concepts of inten- 
tion, voluntariness, and purpose play a crucial 
role in legal and political issues of broad and 
general interest. The nine essays in this volume 
fall into two categories: philosophy and law, 
and philosophy and war. An epilogue consists 
of one essay on academic freedom. 
Part 1, on the philosophy of law, contains 
four papers. The first two, "Direct and 
Oblique Intention and Malice Aforethought" 
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